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legal profession's fifty-year history of impatience with the privilege itselLfY
Indeed the waiver doctrine has been one of the chief means by which courts
unfriendly to the privilege have sought to undermine it.20 Barred by the Con-
stitution from frontal attacks, courts attack indirectly. In the Rogers decision
a majority of the Supreme Court gave impetus to this trend.
25. Criticism of the privilege goes back to Jeremy Bentham, that Utopian empiricist,
who termed the privilege a "double-distilled and treble-refined sentimentality." 8
WIGmSOm 305. Since then many have agreed with him. Mr. Justice Cardozo expressed him-
self delicately (but decisively) as follows:
"Justice ... would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to
orderly inquiry." Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937).
A Wisconsin committee of the bar recommended its abolition. 8 Wi MoRE 313. But in
1937 the ABA considered the privilege worth preserving as a necessary protection against
overzealous district attorneys. 8 WIGNxORE § 2251. (See note 9 supra.)
Wigmore seems self-contradictory: basically distrustful of the privilege and opposed
to it, he yet recognizes the dangers which would attend its abolition, so that he is in a
position where he can neither accept it nor propose doing away with it. Compare state-
ment at 8 WIGMORE 309 with his later and typical statement that the privilege "should be
kept within limits the strictest possible." Id. at 318.
Two eminent professors intimate that police brutality and the third degree are rather
understandable techniques of law enforcement, considering the handicap of the privilege,
and suggest-with an ingenious logic-the abolition of the privilege as a remedy for
police illegality. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND CO.mON LAW, 102-19
(1947) ; Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crine, J. CnIm.
L. & CRItNTOLOGY 1014 (1934).
For other typical if unenlightening criticisms, see 15 YALE L. J. 127 (1905) ; 18 ICY.
L. J. 18 (1929); 12 CONST. REV. 157 (1928). See also 48 Mxcii L. Rtv. 230, 231-2
(1949), discussing Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949), an OPA case involving
compulsory disclosure:
"[A]s governmental regulative functions increase there is a great need for some
complete limitation to compel testimony in order to facilitate the enforcement of
these regulations."
26. See Frank, J., dissenting, in United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 847-50 (2d
Cir. 1942) ; and Black, J., dissenting, in Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375-6 (1951).
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FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
THE operation of international organizations in the United States has
brought a new class of litigants kmocking at the doors of American federal
courts.' International law now recognizes the "legal personality" 2 of the
United Nations,3 since it permits that organization, and several others,4 to
1. The International Refugee Organization knocked in vain in I.R.O. v. Republic
Steamship Corp., 92 F. Supp. 674 (D. Md. 1950). But the United Nations was granted
audience in Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. U.S., 90 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1950). See page
114 infra.
2. "Legal personality" is a convenient label to indicate that the entity possessing the
"personality" has an identity apart from that of its members, and is capable of entering
into legal relations. But "to regard legal personality as a thing apart from the legal
relations is to commit an error of the same sort as that of distinguishing title from the
rights, powers, privileges, and immunities for which it is only a compendious name. With-
out the relations, in either case, there is no more left than the smile of the Cheshire Cat
after the cat had disappeared." Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YxI -J. 233, 294 (1923).
3. The International Court of justice recognized the legal personality of the United
Nations in an advisory opinion. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Scrice of the
United Nations, I.C.J. REP'Ts (1949), 43 AaL J. I:,"fL L. 5S9 (1949). The case in-
volved the U.N.'s efforts to obtain reparations for the murder of Count Folke Berna-
dotte while he was serving as U.N. Mediator in Palestine. The International Court held
unanimously that the U.N. could demand reparations through diplomatic channels irom
the state of Israel for injuries to the Organization. In its advisory opinion, the Court
reasoned that by entrusting certain functions to the U.N. its Members intended the
Organization to possess the "competence" to discharge those functions by bringing
diplomatic claims. A majority of the Court held that the Organization could also bring a
claim against a State on behalf of its injured agent or those claiming through him. Judges
Hack-worth, Krylov, Pasha, and Winiarski dissented from this proposition, asserting
that such claims should be brought by the State of which the U.N. agent was a national.
The case is discussed in Sloan, Reparation for Injuries to Agents of the United Nations,
28 NEB. L. REv. 401 (1949), Wright, The Jural Personality of the United vations, 43
Am. J. INT'L L. 509 (1949), The U.N. and Its Agents, 2 SrAm1. L. Rnv. 193 (1950). On
the effect of Advisory Opinions, see Hudson, The Effects of Adzisory Opinions of 111
World Court, 42 Aax. J. INT'L L. 630 (1948).
The Reparations Case is the first judicial recognition of the legal personality of an
international organization. The traditional view is that only "States" can be "subject" to
international law. See Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L Q. Rmr.
438, 446 et seq. (1947). The status of the League of Nations was never determined. See
Corbett, What is the League of Nations?, 5 Bar=. Y.B. INT'L L. 119 (1924). With the
establishment of the U.N. complex of organizations the problem reappeared. See Jenho,
The Legal Personality of International Organirations, 22 BMrr. Y.B. I.NT'L L 267 (1945).
For treaty recognition of the U.N.'s legal personality see note 4 infra.
4. There is no reason why the logic of the Reparations Case should not apply with
equal force to the Specialized Agencies. For a list of these organizations, see note 5 infra.
They are associated with the United Nations by agreement, but operate as independent en-
tities with their own budgets and secretariats. Like the U.N., the functions imposed upon
the Specialized Agencies by their constituent documents are such that "legal personality"
under international law is required to carry them out. But see I.R.O. V. Republic SS
Corp., 92 F. Supp. 674, 677 (1950). See Sharp, The Specialiked Agencies and the United
NatIons, 1 INT'L OnG. 460 (1947), 2 id. 247 (1948).
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enforce rights independently of their member states. Moreover, by signing the
Charter of the United Nations and the Constitutions of the Specialized Agel-
cies, the United States agreed to grant these organizations the legal capacity
necessary for the exercise of their functions on American soil.0
Congress has taken some steps to fulfill the commitments made to these
international organizations in their charters.0 The International Monetary
Fund and the International Bank have been given access to federal courts on
any cause of action.7  Other organizations must look to the International
Whether other inter-governmental organizations like the Pan American Sanitary
Bureau or non-governmental organizations like the International Federation of Friends
of Young Women possess legal personality under the I.C.J. holding is more problematic.
Some of these organizations are performing functions similar to the U.N. organizationi,
while others enjoy a "consultative status" with the U. N. bodies. Several groups and
writers are demanding recognition of their legal personality. See, e.g., WHITE, INTER-
NATIONAL NoN-GovERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (1951).
The legal personality of the United Nations, as well as the Specialized Agencies, has
also been recognized by treaty. The Conventions on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies, adopted by the General Assembly on
Feb. 13; 1946 and Nov. 21, 1947 respectively, provide that these organizations "shall
possess juridical personality". They further provide that "they shall have the capacity a)
to contract, b) to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property, c) to institute
legal proceedings." U.N. Convention, § 1; Specialized Agencies Convention, § 3. Other
sections accord the organizations, their officers, representatives, and other selected person-
nel broad immunities from suit, taxation, confiscation, and search. The United States,
unfortunately, has not yet signed either of these conventions, Interview iVith Oscar
Schachter, Deputy Director of the General Legal Division of the United Nations Secre-
tariat, at Lake Success, N.Y., Nov. 21, 1950.
5. Art. 104 of the U.N. Charter provides: "The Organization shall enjoy in the
territory of each of its Members such capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of
its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes." Substantially similar provisions are
contained in the Constitutions of the Specialized Agencies: World Health Organizations,
Art. 66; International Refugee Organization, Art. 13, § 1; International Labour Organ-
ization, Art. 39; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Art. VII, § 1;
International Monetary Fund, Art. IX, § 2; Food and Agriculture Organization, Art.
XV, § 1; United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, Art. XII;
and International Civil Aviation Organization, Art. 47. No such provisions appear in
the constituent documents of two older Specialized Agencies: the Universal Postal
Union, organized in 1874, and the International Telecommunications Union, which is
the latest incarnation of the International Telegraph Union organized in 1865. These two
organizations are comprised within the scope of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies. See note 4 .upra.
6. Art. 104 of the U.N. Charter was said to be self-executing in Curran v. City of
New York, 191 Misc. 229, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206, 212 (Sup. Ct. 1947), cited with approval
in Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. U.S., 90 F. Supp. 831, 832 (N.D. Cal. 1950). Congressional
action would, therefore, be required only for purposes of giving federal courts jurisdiction
over suits by these organizations. But cf. United Nations v. Adler, 90 F. Supp, 440
(S.D.N.Y. 1950) (judisdictional issue not raised in case turning on immunity from
summons of a non-resident witness).
7. 59 STAT. 516 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 286g (1947). See note 17 infra.
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NOTES
Organizations Immunities Act s for their rights and remedies in American
courts. That Act grants "public international organizations" designated by
Fxecutive Order the capacity to contract, to own and dispose of property, and
to institute legal proceedings.2 But it makes no special reference to the
federal courts.
Two organizations, the International Refugee Organization and the United
Nations, have attempted to gain access to federal courts under this provision.
In International Refugee Organization v. Republic Steamship Corp.,'0 a dis-
trict court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a suit by the I.R.O. against a
Panamanian corporation. The court held that the suit on a ship charter
breached in the United States presented no "federal question" upon which the
court could take jurisdiction."' Another district court, in Balfour, Guthrie &
8. 59 STAT. 669 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 28S (1947). Organizations entitled to its
privileges are:
1) United Nations;
2) Specialized Agencies: F.A.O., I.L.O., Bank, Fund, UzEsco, IC.A.O., I.T.U.,
I.Z.O., W.H.O.;
3) other organizations: Pan American Union, Inter-American Institute of Agricul-
tural Sciences, Inter-American Statistical Institute, Pan American Sanitary Bureau,
International Wheat Council, International Cotton Advisory Committee, Caribbean
Commission, and the South Pacific Commission.
9. 22 U.S.C. §288a (1947). These privileges are made available t.. o,rganizati,,ns
designated under the Act only "'to the extent consistent with the instrument creating
them." Ibid. In order to be entitled to the privileges of the Act, an ornanizatin must
be "a public international organization in which the United States participates pursuant
to any treaty or under the authority of any act of Congress authorizing such participation
or making an appropriation for such participation, and which shall have been designated
by the President through appropriate Executive Order." Ibid. The President is author-
ized to use his discretion in ex-tending, withholding, or revoking any of the privileges and
immunities specified by the Act "in the light of the functions performed by any such
international organization." Ibid.
Immunities from "every form of judicial process", duties, taxes, registration, search
and confiscation may be enxtended to organizations on an equal footing with foreign
states. 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (1947). Officers, employees, and representativcs f foreign
governments associated with designated organizations receive immunities from taxation
and suit (when relating to acts performed by them in their official capacity) only at the
discretion of the Secretary of State. 22 U.S.C. §28Sb, d-. Whatever benefits are
ex-tended to them are specifically stated not to amount to "diplomatic status", and they
may be revoked at the discretion of the Secretary of State. 22 U.S.C. §223e(b). These
latter sections of the Act are severely criticized in Preuss, The Intcrnational Organ ia-
tions Ismzmities Act, 40 Am. J. Irr. L. 332 (1946).
10. 92 F. Supp. 674 (D. Md. 1950).
11. The court interpreted the suit as "merely one to recover damages for fraudulent
breach of a contractual relationship between two aliens." 92 F. Supp. 674, 6c0 (1959).
Hence the suit could not be brought under Section 1332 of the Judicial Code. The only
other basis for jurisdiction would be the presence of a "federal question" under Section
1331. To determine whether jurisdiction could be taken on this basis, the Court adopted
the test approved by Cardozo, J. in Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S.
109, 114 (1936): "the federal nature of the right to be established is decisive--not
the source of the authority to establish it." Thus, although the Immunities Act conferred
1952]
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Co., Ltd. v. United States,12 permitted the U.N. to sue the United States under
the Suits in Admiralty Act for cargo loss.' 3 The court there found that tle
U.N.'s capacity to bring suit was established by the Immunities Act; however,
the jurisdiction of the federal court over the subject-matter was based upon
the Suits in Admiralty Act.' 4 These cases indicate that unless some basis of
federal jurisdiction other than the Immunities Act is presented, suits by these
organizations will be bar*ed from federal courts. 1
The absence from the immunities Act of an explicit grant of federal juris-
diction warrants this conclusion. A case cannot "arise under the laws of the
United States" unless the intention of Congress to create a "federal question"
is clear and specific.' 0 Congress expressed such an intention only in regard
to the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It provided
that any action brought by them is deemed to arise under the laws of the
United States and gave federal district courts original jurisdiction over all
such suits. 17
on I.R.O. its right to contract, the suit at bar involved no "federal right", and federal
jurisdiction could not be assumed.
12. 90 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1950), 15 ALDANY L. Rrv. 128 (1950), 99 U. OF PA,
L. REV. 554 (1951).
13. The suit arose out of defendants' negligence in handling a cargo of powdered
milk shipped to Italy and Greece by the United Nations' International Children's Emer-
gency Fund (UNICEF). This organization is an administrative sub-division of the
U.N. rather than a Specialized Agency and was therefore unable to sue in its own name.
The vessel was owned by the United States, but operated under a bareboat charter by a
steamship company.
14. 41 STAT. 525-8 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1947). The general scheme of the
Act is to prevent the arrest of vessels owned or controlled by the U.S. by substituting
a libel in personam against the U.S. for any libel in rem against the ship. Sec. 742, upon
which the capacity of the U.N. to sue was based provides: "In cases where if such
vessel were privately owned or operated ...a proceeding in admiralty could be main-
tained at the time of the commencement of the action herein provided for, a libel in
personam may be brought against the United States. . . ." The court found the pre-
requisite capacity to sue a private party in admiralty in the Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C.
§ 288a(a) (iii). Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States, supra note 12.
15. For the Judicial Code provisions enumerating bases of federal court original
jurisdiction, see 62 STAT. 930-35 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-59 (1948). The provision
giving district courts jurisdiction over admiralty cases, § 1333, is the only one of these
sections of probable use to international organizations.
16. Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109 (1936). See note 11
supra.
17. 59 STAT. 516 (1945), 22 U.S.C. §286g (1947):
"For the purpose of any action which may be brought within the United States
or its territories or possessions by or against the Fund or the Bank in accordance
with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund or the Articles of Agreement of the
Bank, the Fund or the Bank, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be an
inhabitant of the Federal judicial district in which its principle office in the
United States is located, and any such action at law or in equity to which either
the Fund or the Bank shall be a party shall be deemed tb arise under the laws of
the United States, and the District Courts of the United States shall have original
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Failure to grant other international organizations rights of access to federal
courts such as the Fund and Bank enjoy seems unreasonable. The United
States has made substantially similar treaty commitments to the United Nations
and all of its agencies. s Moreover, their functions also require that they have
rights enforceable in federal courts. The United Nations, its Specialized
Agencies, and several other inter-governmental bodies carry on activities in
the United States. Many of these organizations own property and make con-
tracts.19 Such organizations should be capable of enforcing property rights
and contracts, and of rcdressing tortious wrongs. Relief available to them
through diplomatic channels is too uncertain to meet the needs of these organ-
izations in their conduct of every day affairs.2 0  Nor does capacity to sue in
state courts offer a satisfactory alternative.2 '
jurisdiction of any such action. When either the Fund or the Bank is a defendant
in any such action, it may at any time before the trial thereof, remove such action
from a State court into the district court of the United States for the proper
district by following the procedure for removal of causes otherwise provided by
law. '
18. See note 5 supra.
19. The Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the United States,
22 U.S.C. Supp. IV §287 (1951), gives the U.N. limited sovereignty over its Head-
quarters District in New York City. Similar arrangements ,vere made for the head-
quarters of the Pan American Union in Washington, D.C. See Kunz, The Pan Aimcrican
Union it the Field of Intcrnational Adnzibistration, 31 IOWA L. Rsv. 58 (1945).
In all contracts signed by the United Nations, the following clause is included for the
protection of the adverse party because the U.N. is immune from suit: "Any claim or
controversy arising out of or relating to this agreement or to the breach thereof shall
be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the American
Arbitration Association or such other rules as it may designate. [Then follow provisions
for selecting three arbitrators.] The cost and expense of the arbitration shall be borne
by the parties as assessed by the majority decision of the arbitrators. The parties agree
to be found by any award so made as to the final adjudication of any such claim or con-
troversy." Interview with Oscar Schachter, Deputy Director of the General Legal
Division of the U.N. Secretariat, at Lake Success, N.Y., Nov. 21, 1930.
Among other organizations with headquarters in the United States, the International
Bank is perhaps the most active. Bonds of the Bank, pay-able in dollars, Were sold on the
U.S. market in 1947, 1950, and 1951. This form of dollar indebtedness now totals
$400,000,000, most of which is held by American citizens. INTERATxONAL B.x;I:, SLMTI
AmquAL REPORT TO THE BoAan oF GovER.ioRs, 43 (1951).
20. The only certain method of obtaining satisfaction on international claims is to
amass sufficient power behind the claim to make the adverse state realize that it is in her
interest to pay up. An adjudication by the International Court of Justice may help; how-
ever, this in no way guarantees that the claim will be paid. Cf. The Corfu Channel Case,
I.C.J. RF'Ts 15 (1949); Wright, The Corfu Chamirl Case. 43 Am'. J. I:.N-l L. 491
(1949); Note, 58 YALE L.J. 187 (1948). Or the claim may be adjudicated by a .Mi.od
Claims Commission; this is probably the most effective method. See Fu.Eu, Tim
'MEXIc.! Cr.Axs Co-xmissio.Ns (1935). MOORE, INTERINATION.AL AI ITflATIO e't 11l4).
International organizations are handicapped in prosecuting diplomatic claims by thvir
lack of real power or authority. a
21. Since American treatment of international organizatiuns is likely to have inter-
national repercussions, such organizations should be trcated as nearly as pusibole like
1952]
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Congress should amend the Immunities Act to give international organiza-
tions access to federal courts irrespective of other jurisdictional requirements.
The amendment should grant district courts original jurisdiction over suits by
international organizations against a state or citizen of the United States or
on any cause of action arising within the United States.22  Under a provision
already contained in the Act,23 the president could then designate those organ-
izations 24 whose effective operation requires access to federal courts.
The constitutionality of such a provision is open to little question. 25  Suit by
international organizations would fall under Article III of the Constitution as
a case arising under the laws and treaties of the United States.20 Congress is
undoubtedly authorized to enact legislation implementing the president's power
over foreign affairs.2 7 And the cases indicate that Congress may confer federal
court jurisdiction over ary matter on which it may properly legislate.2 1 If the
nations for purposes of federal jurisdiction. Inter-governmental organizations, like
sovereign states, should therefore have access to the national judicial system. Despite the
fact that uniformity of substantive lav throughout the United States cannot be achieved
in federal courts under Erie RR Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), (state substantive
law must be applied by federal courts except in matters governed by the Constitution or
acts of Congress), these courts follow a single set of procedural rules in civil cases. This
not only simplifies litigation, but in some suits determines whether an action may be
maintained.
22. This proposal is narrower than the present provision in regard to the Bank and
Fund, supra note 17. On its face that statute allows suits against aliens oil causes of action
arising abroad to be heard in federal courts.
For purposes of venue, organizations entitled to the privilege of suing in federal courts
should be considered "an inhabitant of the Federal judicial district in which its principle
office in the United States is located", as is provided for the Bank and Fund. The privilege
of removal whenever an organization, having waived its immunity, appears as (lefendant
should also be made explicit.
23. 59 STAT. 669 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 288a (1947).
24. For the statutory prerequisites of designation see note 9 supra.
25. See MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 137 el seq. (1949).
26. See note 28 infra
27. U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding Congres-
sional resolution authorizing president to invoke arms embargo).
28. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 739 (U.S. 1824) (national bank);
Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885) (federally incorporated railroad);
Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900) (federal land grant); National
Mutual Ins. Co. of D.C. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (residents of the
District of Columbia) ; Wilson & Co. Inc., v. United Packinghouse Workers of America,
83 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (labor contracts in industries affecting interstate com-
merce).
To confer federal-question jurisdiction Congress must 1) be constitutionally capable
of legislating concerning the subject-matter, and 2) state clearly and explicitly its inten-
tion to extend federal jurisdiction. See MOORE, CO-MMENTARY ON THIE U.S. JUDlICIAL
CODE 137 (1949).
. Since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803), (statute expanding original
jurisdiction of Supreme Court held unconstitutional), no federal court has ever invalidated
an explicit Congressional grant of federal court jurisdiction over adversary proceedings.
Cf. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (statute conferring federal juris-
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